A Geopolitical Brief Submitted by the Studenica Foundation for the Hearing of the Sub- Committee on Europe of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, November 15, 2011.
Introduction
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989, the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union and a successful war with Iraq, the United States of America essentially took a leave from world affairs. The administration of President George H.W. Bush expressly declared that America "should not seek to be the world's policeman." Thus, when the wars for dissolution of Yugoslavia started, it was not a surprise to hear Secretary of State James Baker state, "we have no dog in that fight." Indeed, he traveled to Yugoslavia and attempted to preserve the Federation, or at least have its orderly dissolution. Having met resistance in all capitals of the Yugoslav Federation, he returned home, leaving the problem to the Europeans led by resurgent Germany.
Historical Setting
As subsequent events proved, it is unfortunate that the Baker mission failed. It is also unfortunate that the USA did not resolutely insist at least on the orderly and fair dissolution of the country, but rather succumbed to the flawed policy initiatives of Germany for a rapid dismemberment of Yugoslavia along the lines of Germany's geopolitical and historical interests.
The USA basically stayed out of the Yugoslav imbroglio for a while, but then in short order became the "top dog" in the fight. When we got involved, in our haste to respond to the growing crisis, we committed many of the same mistakes as the Europeans did in the past. However, the fundamental flaw was that we reduced the region's complex problems arising from the historical, ethnic, and religious differences of the various peoples of Yugoslavia to a single issue and causality: "the Serbian Question. "
Once the Yugoslav Federation fell apart, around one-third of the Serbs nearly overnight found themselves in new sovereign states hastily recognized by the international community along the internal administrative borders of Tito's Yugoslavia. Due to fears from experiences of genocide and ethnic cleansing during World War II by Croats and Bosnian Moslems, the large Serbian minorities in these countries demanded self-determination. It is also fact that Slobodan Milosevic (of Serbia) and Franjo Tudjman (of Croatia) insidiously exploited these legitimate fears of possible new genocide and forced migration. The Europeans, led by Germany, with us Americans coming along, took the stand that "borders are invaluable" in the Balkans. Hence, the civil wars of the 1990s were inescapably put in motion.
This particular cause of hostilities is important to bear in mind as we focus on unfinished business in the Balkans. Relative to the current problem with Bosnia and Kosovo, paradoxically many of the same voices that demanded the inviolability of borders and denied self- determination for Serbian minorities in Croatia (15%) and in Bosnia (35%) have supported changes of the Serbian border and self-determination/independence for the Kosovo Albanian minority in Serbia (15% to 18%). Thus, we have failed to treat this central question of the Serb minorities on par with others. In fact, we have tried to resolve all others on the account of this one. Many of the difficulties experienced by the US in the Balkans over the past two decades, as well as currently unfinished business in the region, can be in one way or another traced back to this mistaken approach and double standards used.
With the passage of time, it is evident now that the wars of secession in former Yugoslavia have not solely been caused by "Serbian aggression." Other ethnic/religious groups certainly have their substantial share of responsibilities for the hostilities and carnage. In fact, the secessions of Slovenia and Croatia initiated the disintegration of the Yugoslav state. And then their deliberately premature recognition by Germany, followed by international recognition of Bosnia & Herzegovina, inevitably led to the civil wars. Moreover, as David N. Gibbs points out in his important study of the causes of the Yugoslav wars, in addition to Slobodan Milosevic, "Franjo Tudjman was the second nationalist and equally aggressive figure. The relation in regard to the Serbs in Croatia is as morally problematic as the relationship of the Serbian government towards Albanians in Kosovo" (The Origins of Yugoslav Conflict, David N. Gibbs, University of Arizona).
Current Situation
KOSOVO - The current status of Kosovo in effect as an international protectorate is untenable. Already in 1999, Michael Mandelbaum wrote, "NATO's Yugoslav war was a conflict marked by military success and political failure" (A Perfect Failure, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, September/October 1999). Consequences of the NATO intervention on behalf of the Kosovo Albanians after twelve years of international involvement are just the opposite of the original professed goals, these consequences being namely: ethnic cleansing of Serbs and other minorities is nearly completed; a wholesale destruction of irreplaceable medieval religious and cultural heritage of non-Albanians has occurred; the economy is stagnant, while international crime and domestic corruptions are in full advance. Serious charges of organ trafficking involving members of the top political elite of Kosovo are unresolved. Kosovo remains widely corrupt, lawless, intolerant of both ethnic and political minorities, a major transit point for drug
trafficking between Asia and Europe, and has the potential for exporting terrorism to Europe and elsewhere. It is no wonder that the province has been characterized as "the Black Hole of Europe."
Bosnia and Herzegovina - The existing situation in Bosnia is a massive rebuke to our policy. Despite the commitment of multi-billion dollar aid and enormous resources spent for governance of the state as an international protectorate, the country remains mired in poverty and corruption, with dysfunctional government and institutions and unresolved ethnic/religious issues.
The US Geopolitical Interest in the Balkans
We have invested billions of dollars and incalculable prestige and have set up some rather dubious precedents, notably in international law in the Balkans in the course of the past two decades. A legion of experts asserts that these Balkan wars were significant in the restructuring of global geopolitics and establishing "parameters of the new world order."
The importance of the Balkans within the context of our global interests derives from the strategic position of the region relative to several matters of prime concern to us. These include: in general, the Balkans has historically been the point where three worlds - the Moslem, the Catholic and the Orthodox Christian - have interfaced; in particular, proximity to the Middle East, the critical role Balkan countries should play in counter-terrorism, access to and security of oil/gas pipelines and routes from the Caspian region, direct land (Serbia) and water (Danube) connecting transportation lines between Europe and the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and, our relations with Europe, especially Germany and Turkey, and Russia. In this context, we have a significant interest in the Balkan regional geopolitics, in peace and stability, and in fostering the consolidation of democracy and market economies in the region.
The region is still open to exploitation by al-Qaeda and other terrorists which may combine their activities with burgeoning crime, notably in Bosnia and Kosovo. This threat will remain for a time until the final resolution of the Bosnian and Kosovo problems, and, in particular, when the complex issue of "Greater Albania" is put to rest.
The geopolitical crown jewel of this important region has been Serbia, due to its geographical location, history and people. In the 20th century, Germany in both world wars attacked and unsuccessfully held Serbia at a great price of military casualties and spent resources for the duration. This time around, Berlin had a more subtle and appropriate plan for the post-Cold War situation - drastically debase Serbia and the Serbs to the point that they would no longer be a threat to German geopolitical plans for the region. Without firing a shot, Germany has in effect gained economic and geopolitical preeminence of the Balkans which previously she had failed to achieve by means of the two world wars.
Under the control of Serbian communists led by Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia refused and failed to re-establish her traditional good and friendly relationships with the U.S.A. achieved in their common fight in two world wars against Germany. Thus, this geopolitical jewel was not reachable by the USA without a major effort for which America was not willing to make.
In the current situation, regarding possible future outcomes, America's geopolitical consideration must take into account the real possibility of a major rapprochement between Germany and Russia, as well as Islamic pretentions in this "soft under belly of Europe" spearheaded by Turkey. The just inaugurated Nord Stream gas pipeline suggests the essence of this outcome: synergy and mutual interest between a modern industrial/technological power with an export-based economy and a rich in natural resources and vast market and geopolitically potent partner. How many more European crises will Germany be willing to deal with? As George Friedman points out, "In short, the European project is failing Far from emerging as a unified force, the question will be how divided Europe will become." (Stratfor November 8, 2011). If the "European project" fails and the German-Russian geopolitical interests seriously intertwine, where does it leave America? The Balkans would undoubtedly become a sphere of influence and domination by the German-Russian tandem. America's interest will be hemmed in what would become "the Greater Albania." Nonetheless, this only ally is undemocratic, tribal, corrupt and a historically proven unreliable partner. Moreover, this state and the people are strongly coveted by the rising "neo-osmanism" of Turkey (this new Turkish policy is ably presented and analyzed by Professor Darko Tanaskovic, in his latest and just published book Neo-osmanism. He was ambassador of Yugoslavia to Ankara and the Vatican and is considered to be one of the top experts on Islam).
The Turkish current minister of foreign affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, formulated the geo-strategy of "Neo-osmanism" in his book Strategic Depth (2001). According to Ambassador Tanaskovic, the basic corner-stones of the approach are three historically significant geopolitical regions: the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans. Of the three, the Balkans is considered to be the most important for Turkey. A serious and in-depth scrutiny of neo-osmanism will reveal without any doubt that Ankara regards the Balkans among other things as its Trojan horse for entering Europe permanently and on its own terms. No wonder that Turkey has been consistent in doing everything possible to create a strong, Moslem controlled Bosnia and a strong expanding Albania with Kosovo. At the same time, she is carrying out a sensitive balancing effort. Ankara is cognizant that "without constructive participation of Belgrade, it is impossible to implement the end goals that Ankara is striving to achieve in the Balkans (Neo-osmanism, p. 148). The USA must be mindful that Neo-osmanism is a geopolitical construct based on Turkish national interest and strong identity and is increasingly imbued by metaphysics and the ideology of Islam. The sacrosanct secular model of Ataturk's Turkey is no longer viable, and its resurrection in the foreseeable future is not probable.
Therefore, if America has any interest in the region and European affairs, she must take the aforementioned realities in consideration, when assembling her geopolitical puzzle. A fundamental shift in policy towards Serbia should be back on the table in Washington for consideration.
Recommendations and Solutions
In a published analysis Back to the Balkans (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February 2005), Edward P. Joseph sets forth the basic proposition for "fixing" the region. Stressing that "the region remains fractured and capable of producing turmoil," he advocates the requirement to
"adopt a new guiding principle.. .a standard to apply consistently and without favoritism." He also asserts that the United States must make an effort to fix the Balkans and elaborates on the dangers of delay.
Serbia—Reset relationship. It is not too late for America to reset its two decades old anti-Serb posture. In view of the possible aforementioned developments, it would be prudent to recognize the "Serbian question" and help find its resolution in a fair and honest manner without further delay.
By history, geography and numbers, the Serbs are still the major factor in the region. It is in our long-term national interest (a) to identify common points of interest with Serbia, (b) to meaningfully help her make the painful and difficult transition to genuine democracy and market economy and, thus, (c) to re-establish our historical friendship and keep full Serbian support for the war on terrorism. For over a hundred years, Serbia was the best and at times the only ally of America in the region. It is indeed questionable if a Berlin-centric Europe is in our long term national interest, particularly if a German-Russian geopolitical rapprochement remains even a distant possibility in the future. Germany, followed by France, attempted in 1991-92 to make NATO irrelevant and also launch an independent foreign policy for the EU. The recent European nearly open hostility to our national interest in the Middle East and the war with Iraq is certainly indicative of potential problems we may have in the future. It would historically and realistically be more likely that Belgrade and Athens - not Zagreb, Sarajevo and Pristina - hold the line of the German and/or Russian domination and Turkey's influence over this key geopolitical region. And, in the final analysis, "the only power that has an interest in controlling Islamic actions in
the region is, interestingly, Serbia what could happen is that, in the end, the United States
must rely on the Serbs to deal with the current war (on terror)" The Balkan Theatre of Operations, Stratfor Strategic Forecasting, September 22, 2003.
Bosnia & Herzegovina - Re-establish the letter and spirit of the Dayton Accords and let the people of Bosnia decide their future. The basic guiding framework may go along these lines: (1) no unitary Bosnia, but rather a sort of a confederate Bosnia, recognizing realities in the country and mind-sets of the Serbian and Croatian people who constitute the majority of the country and absolutely do not want to be ruled by Bosnian Moslems from Sarajevo, (2) prompt withdrawal of the Office of the High Commissioner, (3) the thusly reformed state should be seriously and continually aided by the EU in preparations to eventually join the Union, and (4) further meddling of Turkey in the internal affairs of Bosnia should be resolutely discouraged.
KOSOVO - Seek a negotiated settlement that will produce lasting stability in the region. Practical options that may lead Kosovo and Serbia out of the current quagmire should include but are not limited to the following:
(1) implementing negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina on the basis that all issues are on the table, including adjustment of the border, (2) establishing clear and enforceable mechanism for resolution of all property and tangible assets issues such as private assets of Serbian citizens, land and other assets of the Serbian church and its historical sites, and mineral resources, (3)
iron clad guarantees and protections of the Serbian holy and historical sites identical to the autonomy of Mount Athos in Greece.
Concluding Thoughts - The Need for Clear Geopolitical Strategy
The United States in the course of the past two decades has consistently declared in regard to the Balkans that we want "peace and stability, democracy and free market economy, the rule of law and equal rights for all." These are lofty goals which nonetheless have received only lip service from us. People who fear for their physical existence, their identity, historical heritage and who cannot feed their families and have no hope for improvement, have no interest or stake in democracy, civic society and market economy.
The region will not be stable or have a positive vision of a democratic future if it is restructured on the basis of the interests of only one ethnic/religious group, even if it has plurality or majority in the country or in a geographic area.
The need for a clear USA geopolitical strategy in regard to the Balkans with a long run view is needed and is long overdue. It should start with genuinely resetting the United States relationship with Serbia. In addition to the aforementioned possibility of the German-Russian alliance and the advent of Neo-osmanism, there are many other factors that may adversely affect our position in this strategic region. I recall my concluding remarks as a witness at the hearing before the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on the topic "U.S. POLICY TOWARD BOSNIA AND THE BALKANS" (May 11, 1994). These remarks from the past are still germane today and a good way to conclude this brief:
If it is our goal, then, to: (1) keep the Balkans in turmoil, (2) destabilize Europe, (3) hasten the advent of a defiant and strong nationalist Russian state, (4) support the establishment of a "Germanic Belt "from the Baltics to the Adriatic, (5) create out of Bosnia—Herzegovina and Greater Albania a bridgehead for expansion of Islam into Europe, the policies we are pursuing are indeed on the right track.
Michael Djordjevich President
Studenica Foundation
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